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Financial Incentives for Deploying Carbon Capture and Storage:

How Much are they Worth?

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Background

- Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a critically important technology for addressing climate change
 - IPCC estimates cost savings of trillions of dollars to meet global targets currently under discussion
- There are a number of barriers to early CCS deployment – this presentation deals with one, cost
- Government incentives for initial plants are essential to help deploy the technology:
 - Initial cost
 - Technical risk
 - Operation costs -- in the absence of sufficiently high CO₂ prices
- We estimate how companies might value potential incentives

EPRI analyzes policy proposals ... we do not make them.

Study Approach – Cost to Beat Coal w/o CCS ... Also Have to Beat Gas, Nuclear, Wind ...

- Compares a new supercritical pulverized coal (SPC) plant without capture to a new SPC with capture
 - Assumes you have to pay for storage
 - Sensitivity case with Enhanced Oil Recovery
- Calculates the cost of electricity (COE) for both and finds the cost gap
 - Note, this evaluation considers only the value of incentives and excludes project execution risk
- Calculates the value of incentives in COE terms
 - Accounts for interactions between incentives
- Shows how packages of incentives can bridge the COE gap

CAVEAT: Our analysis provides only a general guide to valuing incentives.

Key Cost and Performance Parameters: Supercritical PC with and without CCS (2010\$)

| | Conventional Supercritical PC | SPC with CCS |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Capital Cost (\$/kW) ^a | 2,115 | 3,540 ^b |
| Dispatched Capacity Factor | 92 % | 65-88 % ^c |
| Heat Rate (MMBtu/kWh) | 9000 | 12,650 |
| Variable O&M (non-fuel – \$/MWh) | 8.50 | 24.66 |
| Fixed O&M (\$/kW/Year) | 38 | 40 |
| CO₂ emissions (tons/MWh) | 0.860 | 0.124 |

a. Does not include 10% owner's cost or interest during construction.

b. Assumes an amine-based capture system.


c. The base scenario assumes that the conventional PC plant is available 92% of the time. The PC+CCS plant is assumed to have 65% availability in year 1, 70% in year 2, 75% in year 3, 80% in year 4, 85% in year 5, and 88% in years 6-30. Both units are assumed to be dispatched whenever available.

Key Financial Assumptions for Different Project Owners

| | Investor-owned Utility (IOU) | Independent Power Producer (IPP) | Public |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| Fraction Debt | 55 % | 70 % | 100 % |
| Cost of Debt* | 6.5 % | 8.0 % | 4.5 % |
| Cost of Equity | 11.5 % | 13.0 % | N/A |
| Tax Rate | 39.2 % | 39.2 % | 0 % |
| Inflation Rate | 2% For All | | |

* Assumes you can get a loan

Cost of Electricity (COE) Estimates Made for Two CO₂ Price Scenarios -- \$15/ton CO₂ and \$30/ton CO₂



- CO₂ price scenario named for first year price
- CO₂ price assumed to increase at 5% real per year
 - \$15/ton scenario hits \$62/ton after 30 years; levelized cost is \$27/ton CO₂
 - \$30/ton scenario hits \$124/ton after 30 years; levelized cost is \$54/ton CO₂

Cost of Electricity (COE) Estimates for SPC with and without CCS (\$/MWh)

| \$15/ton CO₂ Case | IOU | IPP | Public |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Supercritical PC | \$ 97 | \$ 98 | \$ 85 |
| SPC w/ CCS | \$130 | \$131 | \$104 |
| COE Gap @ \$15/ton CO₂ | \$ 34 | \$ 32 | \$ 20 |
| \$30/ton CO₂ Case | IOU | IPP | Public |
| Supercritical PC | \$121 | \$122 | \$111 |
| SPC w/ CCS | \$134 | \$134 | \$108 |
| COE Gap @ \$30/ton CO₂ | \$ 13 | \$12 | -\$ 3 |

Government Incentives Can Help Close the Gap

| | Value of the Incentive, \$ per MWh | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| | IOU | IPP | Public | |
| Loan Guarantee (w/ no fee) | \$ 1 | \$ 3 | \$ 0 | <u>Threshold issue??</u> |
| Direct Loan | \$ 4 | \$ 8 | \$ 0 | |
| Cost Sharing (30% w/o repay) | \$15 | \$15 | \$ 7 | |
| Investment Tax Credit (20%, without accelerated depreciation) | \$ 6 | \$ 6 | \$ 0* | |
| Production Tax Credit (\$20 per MWh for 10 years) | \$ 9 | \$ 9 | \$ 0* | |
| Feed-in Tariff -- \$15/ton CO2 | \$20 | \$20 | \$16 | |
| 2 Bonus Permits/ton CO2 (for 10 years) | | | | |
| • \$15/ton CO2 Scenario | \$20 | \$20 | \$16 | |
| • \$30/ton CO2 Scenario | \$39 | \$39 | \$33 | |
| COE Gap at \$15/ton CO2 | \$34 | \$32 | \$20 | |
| COE Gap at \$30/ton CO2 | \$13 | \$12 | -\$3 | |

*Comparable incentive can be made available.

Incentives Can Close the Gap

- Loan guarantees or direct loans
 - Provide only a small benefit ... **unless** needed to get a loan
 - Low-cost to the government
- Tax credits
 - Provide significant value to companies with tax liability, but none to public power
 - Cost to government is same as benefit to company
- Everyone can use \$\$...
 - Cost sharing, free permits, and feed-in tariff benefit all
 - “Availability insurance” may provide targeted value, but the concept needs more refinement

... but government may want “return” of funds if CO₂ prices rise

Packages of Incentives Could Reduce or Eliminate the COE Gap

- Packages of incentives can address specific risks, e.g.,
 - Cost share can provide initial capital
 - Availability insurance can provide cash if the technology fails to operate
 - Production tax credit can reward CCS operation when CO2 price is not sufficient

| | Value of Incentive Package, \$/MWh | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| | IOU | IPP | Public |
| 20% ITC + Accelerated Depreciation | \$12 | \$12 | \$ 0 |
| 30% Cost Share + \$20 PTC | \$15 | \$15 | \$ 7 |
| 40% Cost Share + \$30 PTC | \$33 | \$34 | \$10 |
| 30% Cost Share + \$20 PTC + Enhanced Availability Insurance | \$29 | \$30 | \$ 8 |
| COE Gap at \$15/ton CO2 | \$34 | \$32 | \$20 |
| COE Gap at \$30/ton CO2 | \$13 | \$12 | -\$ 3 |

What Difference Does “Claw Back” Make? e.g. for an IOU

Cost Sharing with “Claw Back”

- 30% government cost sharing,
- “profit” = after tax profit plus depreciation plus value of CO2 reduction
- pay back government with 33% of “profit” after capital investment is recovered

| | \$15/ton CO2 | \$30/ton CO2 |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Value of Incentive w/o Claw Back (\$/MWh) | \$15 | \$15 |
| Year pay back starts | 8 | 7 |
| Year pay back ends | 13 | 10 |
| Value of Incentive w/ Claw Back (\$/MWh) | \$10.26 | \$9.54 |
| COE Gap | \$34 | \$13 |


Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) Can Make A Huge Difference

- For CO₂ used for EOR, assume \$20/ton CO₂ rising at 3% real per year

| | Value in \$/MWh | | |
|--|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| | IOU | IPP | Public |
| EOR @ \$20/ton CO₂ + 3% real | \$31 | \$31 | \$ 33 |
| COE Gap at \$15/ton CO₂ | \$34 | \$32 | \$20 |
| COE Gap at \$30/ton CO₂ | \$13 | \$12 | -\$ 3 |

CCS Will Likely Need to Operate Flexibly: Anti-correlation of Wind with Load Creates a Ramping Challenge (e.g., 50GW of wind in Northwest Central US)

NWC Time Series from 8/9/07 to 8/16/07 w 50 GW Added



Final Thoughts on Financing CCS

- The financing gap between a plant with CCS and one without is large and very sensitive to CO₂ price
 - CO₂ price is uncertain; lenders may/will assume it will be low or at the “floor”
- Incentive packages can address a range of risks – initial cost, poor operation, operation when CO₂ price is low
- Incentive packages likely must find balance between insufficient incentive to build and excess revenues
 - Incentives can be designed to address excess revenues
- Ultimately, CCS will compete with nuclear, renewables, and natural gas in supplying lower-carbon electricity
- Flexible operation of CCS will likely be key


Government incentives provide value only if
they work for enough companies to get initial plants built



Together...Shaping the Future of Electricity

Cost of Electricity Depends on CO₂ Price ...

E.g., Allowance Price Estimates for Waxman-Markey



Note: Allowance prices could approach \$100/ton if offsets do not materialize in large quantities at costs assumed

Backup Slides – Definition of the Incentives

- Loan Guarantee – Government guarantees a loan for 80% of the capital cost. Interest rates drop 0.7% (IOU), 1.1% (IPP), and 0.0% (Public).
- Direct Loan Government lends 80% of the capital cost at its borrowing rate. Interest rates drop 2.0% (IOU), 3.5% (IPP), and 0.0% (Public).
- 30% Cost Sharing - Government (or other entity) contributes 30% of the capital cost of the plant. There is no repayment of the contribution.
- 30% Cost Sharing with Payback - Government contributes 30% of the capital cost of the plant. The owner pays back the cost sharing over 20 years..

Definition of the Incentives

- 20% ITC - Government grants an investment tax credit equal to 20% of the plant capital cost to the plant owner.
- \$20 Production Tax Credit – Government gives a \$20 per megawatt hour (for the electric industry) or per ton of CO₂ avoided (for the petroleum sector) production tax credit (PTC) to the plant owner for a period of ten years.
- Accelerated Depreciation – Government reduces the period for depreciating the capital investment for tax purposes from 20 years to 5 years.
- Availability Insurance – – Government guarantees the interest on and repayment of debt on any shortfall in plant output below a negotiated target plant capacity factor for ten years. The target is 88% and the payment is the fraction shortfall from this target times the debt service.